law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.""
Given the complexity of the communications industry, Congress understood that while a primary examination of competitive issues by antitrust enforcement agencies is important, the FCC also needs to consider a number of other factors that are not part of the typical Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust merger review process. 2 Several of those factors are discussed in Section III below. 3 While the antitrust agencies (via the Hart-Scott-Rodino process) are in an excellent position to address whether a particular merger would "substantially lessen competition,"' 4 the Clayton Act standard does not account for how the continuing presence of other residual "public interest" obligations required by law-most notably universal service requirements, 5 issues of public health and safety, 6 foreign ownership restrictions, 7 etc.-affects firms' conduct and industry structure. 8 Moreover, this dual-review process is not unique to the communications industry, as Congress also established a dual-review process for other complex industries, such as electricity and banking, where a similar dynamic analysis of non-traditional factors must be taken into account.
9
In addition, the antitrust enforcement agencies simply may not have the industry expertise to understand all of the complexities and nuances of the tele-
"l

Id. at § 303(r) (emphasis added).
12 See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 201 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that even though the Act removes the FCC's ability to insulate telecommunications companies from DOJ antitrust review, it does not remove its ability to review for licensing purposes).
13 See discussion infra Part Ill. FCC's International Telecommunications Policy Initiatives 1985 -1998 , 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 111 (1998 ; addendum 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 519 (1999) .
18 See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980 ) ("[R] esolution of the sometimes-conflicting public interest considerations 'is a complex task which requires extensive facilities, expert judgment and considerable knowledge of the * * * industry. Congress left that task to the Commission .... ') (quoting McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 (1944) [Vol. 18 com business. 2° In light of rapid technological change, using the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines ("Merger Guidelines") 2 ' as the only guidepost for reviewing industry transactions could force the merger review process to rely solely upon a rigid, static view of industry structure.
2 Moreover, the Merger Guidelines are simply not designed to account for the myriad of FCC rulemakings and adjudications that occur literally everyday and which often affect any static competitive analysis. For both of these reasons, it is not uncommon for the FCC to detail staff and lend its expertise to the DOJ or FTC to assist in those agencies' reviews of communications industry mergers under the Clayton Act. L. REv. 241, 250-54 (2009). outcome of a policy focus on "inter-modal competition" has been a phase of "intra-modal mergers" among similarly situated companies seeking to maximize economies of scale and scope. 26 Given the direct interrelationship between these mergers and regulatory policy, the FCC stands in an important position to determine whether these proposed intra-modal transactions will advance Congress' long-standing policy mandate that "all the people of the United States [shall have access to] a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide;., communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges
,127
The industry has been down this path before. When the FCC auctioned off the PCS spectrum in the mid-1990s, it essentially guessed that five wireless carriers (the existing two cellular carriers plus the A, B, and C PCS spectrum blocks) was the appropriate number of firms for the market and also supposed that regional-as opposed to national-geographic licensing would be appropriate. 28 Prior research has demonstrated that because significant fixed and sunk costs are inherent in the telecom industry, the number of firms will tend to reach a relatively concentrated equilibrium. [Vol. 18 graphic areas.
3
" If the natural equilibrium structure favored fewer and larger national players, then mergers should have been expected as a natural consequence of this initial policy choice in selecting a "starting point."'" Accordingly, the subsequent wave of wireless mergers was an entirely logical outcome and reaction (or "sorting") by the market in response to a deliberate public policy choice. Antitrust agencies and the FCC may view such developments in a different light: to an antitrust agency, rapid consolidation may signal an imminent competition problem, while to the FCC, such rapid consolidation is the expected consequence of a conscious public policy choice. In this environment, traditional tools of antitrust analysis might not present a complete picture of the emerging competitive dynamic.
32
The same can be said for competition issues relating to vertical conduct and acquisitions. The trend in antitrust law has been not to review "vertical" mergers closely, based on the arguments of scholars that such transactions often promote economic efficiency and only rarely have adverse competitive effects. 33 In contrast, public policy has traditionally treaded more carefully re- ECON. 193, 193 (1996) (asserting that "legal precedent requiring the courts to draw inferences about market power based primarily or exclusively on market shares and/or market concentration can often be misleading .... [T]he only alternative to such judge-made bright-line rules is to utilize modem economic tools to undertake more extensive competitive analyses"). garding vertical issues in the communications industry. 34 These concerns have been notable in the context of access to video programming. Congress has passed laws that limit the ability of cable systems to restrict the distribution of video programming networks to rivals. 35 Since many cable firms are vertically integrated with the most popular programming networks, concerns over whether cable mergers would impact the distribution of such programming networks play an important role in the FCC's merger review process.
36
In reviewing cable industry mergers, the FCC makes a careful determination as to whether such programming distribution issues are better resolved through company-specific, merger-specific conditions, or whether existing program access laws, which apply to the industry generally, are sufficient. (July 30, 1981) . In reviewing this cable industry merger, the Commission observed that:
[V]ertical integration has conflicting components, in terms of the incentives involved.
While it may create a natural tendency for the systems involved to deal with affiliated enterprises, it is also the engine for the creation of new products and services to increase the value of the total package of services offered [to] the public. To resolve this merger-specific harm, the FCC approved the transaction subject to the imposition of narrowly-tailored mergerrelated arbitration conditions designed to alleviate the regional sports programming problem.
4
" But the FCC refrained from imposing broader obligations in response to arguments from competitors that they generally were having difficulty obtaining affiliated, national programming from Time Warner and Comcast. 4 " In that context, the FCC did not impose conditions because it reasoned that the existing program access rules were the appropriate forum to handle such disputes.
42
In summary, the FCC has the legal obligation to review communications industry mergers. This dual review is not unique to the FCC and is also present in other industries like banking and energy. 43 The sheer breadth and complexity of the communications industry necessitates this dual review, because communications industry transactions reflect not only questions of static economic efficiency and market power, but they also reflect the shifting of regulatory policy and technological change. As the Supreme Court said in Brand X, "[n]othing in the Communications Act or the Administrative Procedure Act makes unlawful the Commission's use of its expert policy judgment to resolve these difficult questions. 
III. THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" STANDARD REQUIRES A THOROUGH ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE ISSUES
Properly applied, the FCC's "public interest" merger review authority can navigate these waters and take into account the complex and unique characteristics of the communications industry. Precedent makes clear that in reviewing mergers pursuant to the public interest standard, the FCC must consider competitive effects and conduct a rigorous economic analysis. 4 " While one can dispute the FCC's application of economics in many prior proceedings, any argument that the "public interest" standard is devoid of meaning under current law (and, therefore, that the FCC should abdicate its core responsibilities and defer to the DOJ or FTC) simply is not supported by case law.' The universal requirement to consider competitive effects under the public interest standard stands in direct contrast to other, more politically-charged topics, like employee job concerns, which may only be considered when the statute provides specific language ordering the administrative agency to do so. See NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976) . The Supreme Court noted that employee job concerns did not fall within the scope of the Federal Power Commission's "public interest" inquiry to ensure "just and reasonable rates," because "the use of the words 'public interest' in a regulatory statute is not a broad license to promote the general public welfare. The FCC's charge is no easy task, given the complexity and rapidlychanging nature of the communications industry.
5 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger review process focuses upon whether the merged firm would be able to sustain a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price over a very short time-span and will examine entry that is likely to occur within two years. " This approach, by definition, largely focuses the attention of the antitrust enforcement agencies on the current competitive environment and not on the environment that is likely to emerge over the next five to ten years. The FCC's authority under the Communications Act is significantly broader because the FCC, like other administrative agencies, is "entrusted with the responsibility to determine when and to what extent the public interest would be served by competition in the industry."" Therefore, it is not unreasonable to 227 (1997) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r, dissenting). Azcuenaga explained that because the FCC already had rules in place prohibiting discriminatory prices and practices, there was "little justification" for the FTC to require Time Warner to "comply with communications law" and, therefore, to the extent that the proposed consent order offered "a standard different from that promulgated by Congress and the FCC, it arguably is inconsistent with the will of
Congress"-as such, "[tJhere is much to be said for having the FTC confine itself to FTC matters, leaving FCC matters to the FCC." Id. (emphasis added).
55 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997) (noting that regulatory schemes concerning telecommunications have "special significance" because of the "inherent complexity and assessments about the likely interaction of industries undergoing rapid economic and technological change"); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc., v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742 (1996) ("[We are] aware ... of the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, see, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996 ...."); Columbia Broad., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) ("The problems of regulation are rendered more difficult because the ... industry is dynamic in terms of technological change .... "); FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) ("The Communications Act is not designed primarily as a new code for the adjustment of conflicting private rights through adjudication. Rather it expresses a desire on the part of Congress to maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission.").
56
See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,554-55, 41,561-62 (Sept. 10, 1992) .
57 United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) . See Northeast Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 947-48 (lst Cir. 1993) . The court noted that the public interest standard does not require the administrative agency in question, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "to analyze proposed mergers under the same standards that the [DOJ] ..
• must apply" because an administrative agency is not required to "serve as an enforcer of antitrust policy in conjunction" with the DOJ or FTC, and thus, while the agency "must include antitrust considerations in its public interest calculus ... it is not bound to use antitrust principles when they may be inconsistent with the [agency's] regulatory goals." Id. See also Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) " are also not subject to ad hoc manipulation by enforcement authorities and regulatory excess.
6 ' FCC merger orders under the "public interest" standard are subject to judicial review, just as courts review consent decrees entered into by the government and merging parties pursuant to the Tunney Act. 62 As such, the argument that somehow the DOJ/FTC process is in fact inherently "better" or "more consistent" is entirely subjective.
IV. WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY
Of course, while the FCC clearly has the obligation to examine competitive issues, a crucial question is whether there are any appropriate limits on the FCC's authority. Unfortunately, the FCC has in the past interpreted its mandate incorrectly, and did not limit its review to determining whether a merger is "in" or "consistent with" the public interest, 63 but instead sought to utilize the nications Act gives us much more flexibility and more precise enforcement tools that (sic) the typical court has"). 
61
As former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris noted, the "unfair competition standard" in the wrong hands produced "a series of proposed rules relying upon vague theories of unfairness that often had no empirical basis, could be based entirely upon the Commissioners' personal values, and did not have to consider the ultimate costs to consumers of foregoing their ability to choose freely in the marketplace." Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the Aspen Summit: Cyberspace and the American Dream (Aug. 19, 2003) , available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/030819aspen.htm#N 49. merger review process to otherwise "enhance the public interest." ' As noted above, critics have legitimately seized upon this inconsistency and claimed that the FCC has abused its authority to impose narrowly-tailored merger conditions 65 and, therefore, cannot be trusted to uphold the basic maxim that competition policy-either by antitrust enforcement agencies or by administrative agencies-is designed to protect competition and not individual competitors.
66
However, while the FCC has not always stuck to this fundamental precept, the law is clear that the FCC must exercise its public interest authority with analytical rigor and caution.
67
The most important limitation on the FCC's public interest standard is the precept that the focus of the standard is upon the interests of the public, and not the interests of competitors who may seek to use the merger process to hamstring a competitor. For example, in the 1981 case of Hawaiian Telephone v. FCC, 6 " the D.C. Circuit remanded an FCC grant of Section 214 authority for service between the U.S. mainland and Hawaii because it found that the Commission had engaged in an ad hoc approach that improperly aimed at "equaliz-
The court found that it is "enough if the applicants show that the proposed merger is compatible with the public interest. The Commission, as a condition of its approval, may not impose a more burdensome requirement in the way of proof than that prescribed by law."
Id. (emphasis added).
64 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 2, 2. In that decision, the FCC, rather than requiring applicants to demonstrate that their proposed merger was in the public interest for any number of possible reasons (like efficiency savings that would lead to lower rates), the FCC stated that
[i]n order to find that a merger is in the public interest, we must, for example, be convinced that it will enhance competition. A merger will be pro-competitive if the harms to competition ... are outweighed by the benefits that enhance competition. If applicants cannot carry this burden, the applications must be denied." Id. (emphasis added). Competition is certainly an important goal, but this singular focus on only that one public interest concern to the exclusion of others was, in our view, improper.
65
See sources cited supra note 7. 
67
Cf Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing FCC decision because the order contained no "expert economic data or [analogies] to related industries in which the claimed anticompetitive behavior has taken place" but instead justified its conclusions as "simply 'common sense"'); FCC v. RCA Commc'ns, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 93-95 (Frankfurter, J.) (noting that the FCC's economic analysis may not primarily rely on a "reading of national policy" because agency's actions were simply "too loose and too much calculated to mislead in the exercise of the discretion entrusted to it.").
68
Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974) . The "public interest" standard in the Communications Act is applied in many contexts, such as the granting of licenses, so court decisions on those topics, like Hawaiian Telephone, provide important insight on the limitations of the FCC authority in this area. (quoting Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974 ) (emphasis added); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1112 , 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981 ("[E]qualization of competition is not itself a sufficient basis for Commission action."). One of the counter-arguments to this position is the often misguided notion that the naked "protection of competitors" is the analytical equivalent to attempting to promote tangible new entry into a market currently dominated by a monopoly incumbent. It is not. As the FCC's former chief economist argued, it is "important that the playing field should be leveled upwards, not downwards" because "rules that forbid a firm from exploiting efficiencies just because its rivals cannot do likewise" harm, rather than improve, consumer welfare. 201, 212 (1996) . In highly concentrated industries, the focus of policy should be on regulation that promotes competitive entry, rather than regulation that protects competition. The latter will often turn into the mere protection of the private interests of competitors. Finally, legal scholars have expressed concern that the authority to review mergers is a powerful tool that can easily be misapplied.
8 ' With regard to important industry transactions, this "hold up" power borders on granting the agency absolute power for which there is no check or balance. If agencies approach this task without self-limiting their use of this authority, then the potential to use the process to aggrandize authority and abuse it will be strong. As Judge Frank Easterbrook observed well over twenty five years ago: Often an agency with the power to deny an application (say, a request to commence service) or to delay the grant of the application will grant approval only if the regulated firm agrees to conditions. The agency may use this power to obtain adherence to rules that it could not require by invoking statutory authority. The conditioning power is limited, of course, by private responses to the ultimatums-firms will not agree to conditions more onerous than the losses they would suffer from the agency's pursuit of the options expressly granted by the statute. Thus, FCC Commissioners should exercise restraint on their collective or individual efforts to use the FCC's merger authority to alter the industry through "voluntary" merger commitments that would otherwise be unobtainable through the "normal channels." Accordingly, while the FCC is well within its authority to issue narrowlytailored conditions as appropriate to remedy a merger-related harm, viewing industry mergers as opportunities to promote or jump-start an affirmative public policy agenda via so-called "voluntary" merger commitments-particularly if policymakers are frustrated by an inability to achieve a political consensus on nationwide rules of general applicability-is a troubling extension of regulatory authority by the FCC. While it may be appealing for policymakers to attempt to advance a policy agenda through merger conditions, using the leverage of the merger review process to force a particular outcome down the throats of one particular firm in the industry ultimately may constitute a violation of the public trust. Instead of acting consistent with the public interest, the FCC would be advancing a public policy agenda for which it otherwise may not have the legal authority or political support.
Moreover, coercing merging parties to accept "voluntary" commitments may fail to solve industry-wide problems with industry-wide solutions. AT&T and Verizon-MCI mergers. 5 Yet, the nation's cable industry, which provides more residential broadband connections than AT&T and Verizon combined, has not been subject to that same network neutrality regime, nor has Qwest, BellSouth, or the nation's other local telephone or wireless companies. 6 The merits of such a policy should be debated and considered on an industry-wide basis in a forum of industry-wide applicability. 7 Only in that setting can the industry and the public actively participate in its construction, application, and uniform enforcement. 8 The merger condition drafting and adoption process as a practical matter does not live up to this obligation, as it often occurs in negotiations between the FCC and the merging entities with very little opportunity for public input and review. Are consumers really well-served by backroom, closed-door negotiations between the regulator and prospective merging parties over important public issues? The opportunity for the regulator and the regulated to game such a system to the exclusion of important consumer and competitor interests is strong.
In conclusion, while it is appropriate to impose narrowly-tailored conditions to remedy specific merger-related harms when consumer welfare is at risk, to the extent there are policy issues of generic concern, those issues are better handled in an agency proceeding where they can be effectively dealt with in a focused, comprehensive, and public manner. 89 V. CONCLUSION Without question, the FCC has the authority and obligation to review communications industry mergers. But this authority is constrained: precedent demands that the FCC establish and carry out a cohesive and rigorous approach to merger review that is supported by the law, economics and, of course, the facts. Merger conditions must take into account competitive factors but also must be in the "public interest" and not the interest of individual competitors that are looking to saddle their rivals with unique regulatory burdens.
While there are restraints on the FCC's merger authority, the public interest standard does give the agency great power. Such power begets temptationincluding the temptation to seek to accomplish through merger conditions policy outcomes that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. But FCC Commissioners should exercise restraint in their efforts to regulate through so-called "voluntary" merger commitments. Important public policy issues deserve to be debated openly in industry-wide settings and should not be hidden in the backrooms of the FCC. 89 The FCC has recognized this principle. See Adelphia Order, supra note 26, 192 ("We find that some of the concerns raised are not transaction-specific and are more appropriately addressed in other proceedings.").
